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ABSTRACT: Bridge asset management is often a challenging and complicated task due to the diversity,
multitude and variation of bridge configurations. Much research has been carried out in the field of
asset management which has resulted in a wealth of models to help with the decision making process.
However, often these models oversimplify the process, resulting in a decision making tool that trivialises
the complexity of the decisions. The purpose of this study was to ascertain what the main sources
of variability are in the process and then quantify the impact of them in terms of the Whole Life-
Cycle Cost (WLCC). The study focuses on human-induced variability to ensure the results are directly
influenceable by bridge portfolio managers. The sources of variability identified include misdiagnoses
of defects as well as imperfect repairs and variability in costs, all of which are aspects that bridge
portfolio managers are exposed to. The sources of variability are quantified and then incorporated into
an existing railway bridge WLCC model, established in a previous study, which uses a flexible Petri-
Net (PN) approach which is able to incorporate the complex logic and probabilistic aspects. The model
itself is able to replicate some of the more complicated decisions which have to be made in bridge
asset management, especially those which influence the decisions around rehabilitation. The resulting
model, enhanced with the probabilistic variability, is able to reveal the impact of variability on the
asset condition, WLCC and even understand where operational complexities are occurring within the
system. Incorporating human-induced variability into any model will inevitably increase the financial
and operational burden predicted by the model, however, recognising and modelling these aspects is a
crucial step in providing bridge portfolio managers a more robust and accurate decision making tool
which can more accurately replicate the real world system.
1 INTRODUCTION
The rail infrastructure in the UK is key to com-
merce, enabling the mobilisation of both people
and materials. Management of the railway can be
difficult due to, firstly, its extended heritage re-
sulting in many legacy systems, assets and tech-
niques (Network Rail 2010d). Secondly, the in-
frastructure utilises diverse asset groups covering
signalling and control groups, electrification and
power management systems, structures and struc-
tural support groups and the track itself. Finally,
due to the increasing demand of the infrastruc-
ture, especially when considering the step changes
with the introduction of European Train Control
System (ETCS) (Technical Strategy Leadership
Group (TSLG) 2012).
Due to the complexity of managing the infras-
tructure, decision support tools are becoming more
critical. This study focuses on the management of
railway bridges, specifically focusing on the vari-
ability in the process and how the variability im-
pacts the operational and finance aspects of man-
aging bridges over their life-cycle.
There have been a number of studies that have
modelled bridge asset management, each using dif-
ferent modelling methods and assumptions (Fran-
gopol, Kallen, & van Noortwijk 2004, Miyamoto,
Kawamura, & Nakamura 2000, Morcous, Rivard,
& Hanna 2002). However, what often occurs dur-
ing the creation of these models is that the system,
and the decision making process, is oversimplified
in the model. This often means that the resulting
model, although accurate in its replication of indi-
vidual processes, does not consider the overall sys-
tem complexity. Because of this, the usefulness of
the model is often limited from the perspective of a
bridge portfolio manager. One of the major factors
often overlooked when modelling bridge portfolio
management is that it relies on human recogni-
tion, identification and decisions, which are prone
to error and variability. Trying to incorporate this
human-induced variability into a bridge manage-
ment model would help improve the usefulness of
the model outputs to bridge portfolio managers.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
To be able to analyse variability within a system,
a great deal needs to be understood about the sys-
tem and the decisions which are made within that
system. Some of these decisions will be governed
by industry standards and organisational policy,
but other decisions will rely on human interpre-
tation and decision making. Madanat 1993 and
Ben-Akiva, Humplick, Madanat, & Ramaswamy
1993 identify two fundamental sources of variabil-
ity within models: 1) the certainty of the cur-
rent asset condition and 2) the forward prediction
of the asset condition. The studies both identify
that the variability in asset condition can arise
from measurement errors, defect diagnosis errors
and data input errors, amongst others. The au-
thors state that variability of inspections had not
been incorporated into any bridge maintenance
and rehabilitation model until then. Misdiagno-
sis during an inspection can lead to major con-
sequences with regards to incorrect maintenance
being scheduled. The authors argue that policies
are designed to recommend a suitable maintenance
action which means that a misdiagnosis can only
lead to scheduling a maintenance action that is less
suitable. The studies both assume that the condi-
tion reported by the inspections can contain errors.
The reported condition is only probabilistically re-
lated to the actual condition of the asset. The au-
thors perform a parametric study to ascertain the
effect of variability on the final model outputs. The
results of the study are that as the standard devia-
tion widens, which represents a greater amount of
variability, the higher the WLCC of the asset over
its lifetime. Although this study parametrised and
quantitated the variability, the WLCC could have
been considered in more detail.
Phares, Washer, Rolander, Graybeal, & Moore
2004 and Moore, Phares, Graybeal, Rolander, &
Washer 2001 investigated the variability in inspec-
tion results carried out on highway bridges. For
this study, they collaborated with 49 bridge inspec-
tors who had been trained to the National Bridge
Inspection Standards (NBIS), which is the stan-
dard in the USA. The inspectors were asked to
carry out 10 different field tests across a range
of different types of bridges. The asset condi-
tion reported by each of the inspectors was com-
pared against the Federal Highway Administra-
tion (FHWA) Non-destructive Evaluation Valida-
tion Center (NDEVC). The NDEVC condition was
used as the known/true asset condition and each of
the inspectors reported condition scores was com-
pared against it. The results showed that 78% of
the condition scores reported by the inspectors
were correct at a 95% probability. The authors
conclude that the vast majority of condition rat-
ings (95%) will be within two condition scores of
the true condition, using the NBIS condition scale.
This study is significant in quantifying the variabil-
ity of visual inspections.
Neves & Frangopol 2010 analysed the variabil-
ity of inspections on bridge assets. The analysis
showed that there are a number of factors which
influence the quality of inspections including: the
experience of the inspector, the ease of access of
the asset elements, the topology/configuration of
the bridge and the types of defects. Using these fac-
tors, a probability of misdiagnosis was calculated.
The results showed that a good quality inspection
only has a 5% probability of misdiagnosis whereas
a poor quality inspection produces a 40% proba-
bility of being misdiagnosed.
A number of studies have identified that there
is a great deal of variability in the management
of bridge assets. Madanat 1993 identified that the
misdiagnosis of defects has both a financial and
operational impact where it increases stress on
the maintenance teams. Phares, Washer, Rolan-
der, Graybeal, & Moore 2004 and Moore, Phares,
Graybeal, Rolander, & Washer 2001 quantified
the variability of visual inspection according to a
known condition. The results from this were used
by Neves & Frangopol 2010 to develop different
quality bands for inspections with probabilities of
misdiagnoses calculated. It is clear that variability
has a major impact on the management of bridge
assets, but it has mostly been overlooked in tra-
ditional bridge models which is evident from the
low numbers of studies that address it as the main
focus. Therefore, attempting to incorporate vari-
ability in a bridge WLCC model is worthwhile.
3 NR BRIDGE MANAGEMENT POLICIES
3.1 Condition States
Network Rail (NR), the UK’s largest railway owner
and operator, separate each of their bridges into
individual elements, which are each inspected and
scored. The condition scoring system used is a
2-dimensional, discrete condition system known as
the Severity Extent Rating (SevEx). One axis con-
tains the type of defect and the other axis de-
tails the extent of the defect. The SevEx matri-
ces vary depending on the material composition
of the element. Concrete bridges are used in this
study as the exemplar material type as they are be-
coming the de facto standard for new bridges and
therefore their management is becoming increas-
ingly more important. The SevEx matrix for con-
crete elements ranges from A1, an “as new” condi-
tion to G6, which refers to a permanent structural
defect. The majority of defects within the con-
crete SevEx matrix relate to cracking and spalling.
When the elements get inspected, the SevEx con-
dition is recorded for each one. The historical con-
dition recordings are all stored within a database,
which will be discussed on Section 4.
3.2 Inspection Policy
There are two types of inspection which are stan-
dard within the railway industry for bridge as-
sets: 1) visual examinations, which occur yearly to
ensure asset safety and 2) detailed examinations
which are scheduled according to the asset con-
dition. During detailed examinations the element
conditions are recorded; detailed examinations are
the focus of this study.
NR determine the inspection interval based on
the condition of the asset (Network Rail 2010b).
Assets in good condition (condition states A1,
B2-B5, C2-C3 and D2) are inspected every 12
years, those in medium condition (B6, C4-C6,
D3-D5, E2-E5 and F2-F3) are inspected every 6
years and assets in poor condition (D6, E6, F4-F6
and G2-G6) are inspected every 3 years. This sys-
tem was developed using a risk based approach
and has been back-converted to the SevEx condi-
tion matrix for ease of comparison in this study.
3.3 Maintenance Actions
NR determine the appropriate maintenance action
based on the condition of the asset (Network Rail
2012a). There are three main maintenance types
which are performed: 1) Minor repairs, which are
carried out on elements in condition states B2-B4,
C2-C3 and D2, 2) Major repairs, which are car-
ried out on elements in condition states B5-B6,
C4-C6, D3-D5, E2-E4 and F2-F3 and 3) Replace-
ments, which are carried out on elements in con-
dition states D6, E5-E6, F4-F6 and G2-G6. The
threshold for a replacement to be carried out is
set by the Basic Safety Limit (BSL) within the in-
dustry standards for safety (Network Rail 2010a).
This process has also been developed using a risk
based approach, and back-converted to the SevEx
condition matrix for ease of incorporation in this
study.
4 DATA SOURCE
A variety of data sources were used in this study,
ranging from asset registers, Civil Asset Regis-
ter and Reporting System (CARRS), to inspection
databases, Structure Condition Monitoring Index
(SCMI), and work order databases, MONITOR
and the Cost Analysis Framework (CAF).
As mentioned in Section 3.1, bridge assets are
split into their constituent elements via a defined
hierarchy (Network Rail 2012b). There is a total
of 25,949 bridge assets within the dataset. The to-
tal number of minor elements in the dataset is
563,150. The total number of inspections on mi-
nor elements is 1,397,748 within the dataset.
Concrete bridges were chosen as the exemplar
material type for this analysis. There are 4,434
concrete bridges in the dataset. The main girder
elements were chosen as the exemplar element as
they are often the Primary Load Bearing Ele-
ment of concrete bridges. In the dataset there are
407,708 inspections of concrete main girders.
5 VARIABILITY OF INSPECTIONS AND
INTERVENTIONS
5.1 Variability of Inspections
Detailed examinations are carried out by trained
inspectors who assess each element in detail. Most
railway bridge assets in the UK are inspected in
person, as oppose to using remote condition equip-
ment, and there are differences between inspectors
in both their physical recognition of defects (i.e.
differences in eyesight) even if their technical train-
ing and competence is the same.
Detailed examinations are carried out within
touching distance of the element (Network Rail
2010c). Each of the elements has their condition
recorded according to the SevEx scale and is often
accompanied by a photograph. A senior inspector
will review the recorded conditions and the pho-
tographs; these members of staff often have risen
to the position with many years experience and so
their identification of defects and the severity of
the defects is good, but not infallible.
The studies, mentioned in Section 2, performed
by Phares, Washer, Rolander, Graybeal, & Moore
2004 and Moore, Phares, Graybeal, Rolander, &
Washer 2001, studied the variability of defect iden-
tification on bridge assets. The results were that
the inspectors were correct to within two condi-
tion states. The condition scale used in this study
was linear whereas the condition scale used by NR
is the 2-Dimensional SevEx scale. Transposing the
results found by the authors to the SevEx scale
results in an equivalent variability of ±1 condition
state. Therefore, for a particular condition state,
there may be up to 8 surrounding states within
the ±1 condition range, as seen in Figure 1.
B2 B3 B4
C2 C3 C4
D2 D3 D4
Figure 1: Variability associated with a reported condition
score.
In the example shown in Figure 1, a C3 con-
dition is reported by the inspector as the element
condition. However, due to variability of the exam-
ination process, the C3 being reported could relate
to any of the condition states shown. The mainte-
nance action recommended for an element in a C3
condition would be a minor repair. However, the
maintenance action which is recommended for an
element in condition states C4, D3 and D4 would
be a major repair. Therefore, the consequence of
an erroneous identification is that it could lead to
the wrong type of maintenance being scheduled.
Table 1 shows the results of the analysis carried
out on the SevEx condition matrix to identify the
probability of each condition state leading to the
wrong type of maintenance action being scheduled,
using the ±1 variability. Where a condition state is
on the border of two different maintenance actions,
the probability of a misdiagnosis leading to an er-
roneous maintenance action is higher. Condition
states that are not near borders are not as crit-
ical because an erroneous condition identification
would still result in the same maintenance action.
On average, using the ±1 variability range, main-
tenance actions are scheduled correctly 72% of the
time.
5.2 Imperfect Interventions
Often bridge management models either do not
consider maintenance as an explicit action or as-
sume that maintenance is perfect (i.e. maintenance
improves the condition to a predefined condition
state, often the “as new” or A1 condition) Mor-
cous & Lounis 2006, van Noortwijk & Klatter
2004, Le & Andrews 2013. Although this assump-
tion is an oversimplification of the system, to dis-
pense with the assumption requires an evidence-
Table 1: Probabilities of scheduling the correct maintenance
action when considering inspection variability of ±1 condi-
tion state.
State B2 B3 B4 B5 B6
Probability 1.00 0.80 0.40 0.80 1.00
State C2 C3 C4 C5 C6
Probability 0.80 0.63 0.63 0.75 0.80
State D2 D3 D4 D5 D6
Probability 0.40 0.63 0.75 0.63 0.40
State E2 E3 E4 E5 E6
Probability 0.80 0.75 0.63 0.63 0.80
State F2 F3 F4 F5 F6
Probability 0.60 0.50 0.63 0.88 1.00
State G2 G3 G4 G5 G6
Probability 0.33 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.00
based approach. Therefore, data analysis was car-
ried out using historical maintenance and inspec-
tion records to determine the variability in the con-
dition uplift after an intervention.
The inspection data available for this study in-
cludes both deterioration and condition uplift. In
the previous section it was determined that there
is some variability regarding the accuracy and re-
peatability of element inspections. To ensure this
analysis only considers situations where there has
been an uplift in condition due to an intervention,
rather than due to any variability within the in-
spection procedure, only element condition uplifts
of more than one condition state were considered.
The exemplar element used throughout this study
is the concrete main girder, on which this analy-
sis was performed. The total number of element
inspections which was used for this analysis was
49,300.
The analysis results are presented in Table 2
where it can be seen that interventions which re-
turn the element condition to A1, the “as new”
state, which represents a “perfect repair”, only ac-
counts for 43% of the condition uplifts. This is in
stark contrast to what most bridge management
models assume as the result shows that perfect re-
pairs do not even occur in the majority of occur-
rences. The next most populous condition state is
B3, which accounts for 29% of all condition uplifts
following an intervention.
Table 2: Probabilities of resulting condition states following
an intervention.
State A1 B2 B3 B4 C2 C3 D2
Percent 43% 6.5% 29% 10% 0.4% 11% 0.1%
5.3 Summary
It has been determined that misdiagnoses of de-
fects can lead to incorrect maintenance actions
being scheduled. Transposing the results to the
SevEx condition matrix shows that only 72% of
maintenance actions are appropriate for the con-
dition of the element. In addition to this, an anal-
ysis has been carried out on the condition uplift
following an intervention. This demonstrated that
a “perfect repair” only occurs 43% of the time,
which is in stark contrast to the assumption made
by many other bridge management models that all
interventions result in perfect repairs. These as-
pects will now be incorporated into an existing
WLCC model to quantify the impact that these
sources of variability have on the overall system.
6 WLCC PN MODEL
PNs, created by Petri 1962, have been gaining in
popularity in modelling systems within the com-
munications, manufacturing and engineering sec-
tors (British Standards Institution 2012). An exist-
ing WLCC model will be used in this study which
uses the PN approach (Yianni, Rama, Neves, An-
drews, & Castlo 2016). The advantage that the PN
approach brings to this type of study is that the
logic and probabilistic elements can be more easily
incorporated than in other modelling approaches,
as demonstrated by Andrews 2013. The more ad-
vanced features of the model use the Coloured
Petri-Net (CPN) techniques introduced by Jensen
1997.
The PN WLCC model uses a number of differ-
ent modules which each mimic a different aspect
of bridge management, ranging from the deterio-
ration module to the inspection and maintenance
modules. Each of these has been designed and
calibrated using a combination of historical data,
expert judgement and industry standard policies.
The details which follow in this section are specif-
ically in relation to the modules of the PN model
which are affected by the variability discussed
within this study. The model itself is simulated
using a Monte Carlo (MC) approach and the out-
puts are aggregated to provide a yearly overview,
which gives an insight into the overall system be-
haviour. The full model, and details of all the in-
dividual modules, are given in detail in Yianni,
Rama, Neves, Andrews, & Castlo 2016.
6.1 Maintenance Action Module
The maintenance action module simulates the
events immediate after an inspection, during which
the appropriate maintenance action is decided
upon. As detailed in Section 5.1, the variability of
inspections can lead to incorrect maintenance ac-
tions being scheduled. The probability of a defect
misdiagnosis occurring is 28%.
Within the statistical model, each of the PN
transitions have been enhanced with probabilistic
capabilities and have had the probabilities from
Table 1 embedded within them. These are shown
in Figure 2 by transitions S13−S16. The effect of
this is that there is a probabilistic outcome for the
maintenance actions, calibrated with the probabil-
ities calculated in Table 1. This ensures that the
same probability of an incorrect maintenance ac-
tion being scheduled in the real-world system is
mirrored within the statistical model.
A1
B2 B3
C2 C3
Pending Condition
Condition Determined
Condition Change
T1 T2
T3
T4
T5 T6 T7
T8
T10
T9
A1
B2 B3
C2 C3
Minor Repair Required
Major Repair Required
Replacement RequiredIntervention Planned
Between Inspection
During Inspection
Inspection Occurred
S13 S14 S15 S16
T11
T12
Between Intervention
Intervention Commences
T17
T18
Figure 2: The maintenance action module captures the vari-
ability in the outcome of the inspection procedure.
6.2 Intervention Module
The intervention module is activated once a main-
tenance action has been determined, following an
inspection. The module is modelled on mainte-
nance teams arriving on site to carry out an in-
tervention and performing an initial investigation
to ascertain if the condition of the element and
the maintenance action are compatible. The tran-
sition, marked S18, contains a complex CPN guard
which checks the type of maintenance action which
has been scheduled against the condition of the el-
ement. This allows it to determine if the correct
maintenance action has been scheduled or not. The
variability in inspection, which this model is en-
hanced with, affects both the maintenance action
module and the intervention module.
The intervention module has been embedded
with the results of the imperfect repair analysis,
as seen in Section 5.2. In the model, there is a
probabilistic output to the condition module which
means that the condition uplift following an inter-
vention is calibrated to the probabilities seen in
Table 2. This ensures that the condition uplift fol-
lows the same profile as that seen in the real world
system.
7 IMPACT OF VARIABILITY ON WLCC
Two simulation scenarios were considered for the
analysis: 1) the control scenario, which does not
consider the human-induced variability and 2)
A1
B2 B3
C2 C3
Pending Condition
Condition Determined
Condition Change
T1 T2
T3
T4
T5 T6 T7
T8
T10
T9
A1
B2 B3
C2 C3
Minor Repairs
Major Repairs
Minor Repair Required
Major Repair Required
Replacement RequiredMaintenance Planned
Between Inspection
During Inspection
Inspection Occurred
T13 T14 T15 T16
T11
T12
Between Maintenance
Maintenance Commences
S17
S18
Petri-Net for a Minor Element: Main External Girder (MGE),
Concrete (C). All advanced transitions functions are represented
with dashed arcs. Where D/P represents a decision making
probability transition that uses a random number to determine
which probability the token is placed into e.g. (10%,80%,10%)
if one of the inputs is designed to inhibit then the other op-
tions increase proportionately i.e. if the first 10% was inhibited
then the options would become 80%+(80/90*10) = 88.89% and
10%+(10/90*10) = 11.11%; D/M represents a transition func-
tion where a decision is based on marking, for instance it may
determine the worst condition from the Sub-Minor Element con-
ditions and places a token in the relevant place; R represents a
transition that is designed to reset a place or multiple places.
Transition Delay Type D/M D/P R
T1 Stochastic No No No
T2 Stochastic No No No
T3 Stochastic No No No
T4 Stochastic No No No
T5 Stochastic No No No
T6 Stochastic No No No
T7 Stochastic No No No
T8 Stochastic No No No
T9 Instant No No Yes
T10 Instant Yes No Yes
T11 Conditional Yes No No
T12 Small Delay (ε) No No Yes
T13 Instant Yes Yes No
T14 Instant Yes Yes No
T15 Instant Yes Yes No
T16 Instant Yes Yes No
T17 Conditional Yes No Yes
T18 Conditional Yes Yes Yes
Figure 3: The intervention module is affected by variabil-
ity of inspections, variable intervention costs and imperfect
repairs.
the enhanced scenario, which does consider the
human-induced variability, using the results from
the previous sections. This allows an effective com-
parison to quantify the effect of variability on the
WLCC of bridges. To simulate an entire bridge
asset, an equal number of PN tokens to bridge el-
ements would be entered into the model. For illus-
trative clarity, the outputs shown in this section
were calculated based on a simulation with a sin-
gle concrete girder element, the exemplar element
used throughout this study. The model is simu-
lated using a MC simulation approach over a 100
year timespan.
Figure 4 shows the model output which aggre-
gates the element condition states. It can be seen
in Figure 4(a), the control scenario, which does not
consider imperfect repairs, that the element spends
the majority of the simulation period, ~60%, in
condition state A1. This is because the element
experiences repeated condition uplifts, following
“perfect repairs”, to the A1 “as new” condition,
after every intervention. When considering Figure
4(b), the scenario with imperfect repairs, which is
more accurate to the real-world system, there is
much more of a spread across a number of condi-
tion states. The A1 condition, over the 100 year
simulation period, is lower at only ~40%. The en-
hanced scenario is a more realistic model scenario
and helps to boost the accuracy of the model.
Figure 5 shows the probability of the element
condition over time, aggregated by year. This out-
put is able to demonstrate both the effect of imper-
fect repair and the effect of incorrect maintenance
actions being scheduled. Both scenarios begin the
simulation with the element in an A1 condition,
slowly deteriorating, with an inspection occurring
after 12 years, as is stipulated in the industry pol-
icy on bridge inspections. At this point the element
is rehabilitated with a minor repair. The condi-
tion uplift following these repairs differs based on
the scenario. In Figure 5(a), the control scenario,
the perfect repairs uplift to an A1 “as new” con-
dition. In Figure 5(b), the enhanced scenario, the
uplift can result in a number of different condition
states, as defined from the results in Section 5.2.
For this reason, the sawtooth pattern, which rep-
resents probabilities, is much more defined in the
control scenario than the enhanced scenario.
Misdiagnoses of defects can result in the schedul-
ing of an inappropriate maintenance action. The
occurrence of inappropriate maintenance actions
is evident in the sawtooth patterns within Figure
5. When an inappropriate maintenance action has
been scheduled, the maintenance teams are unable
to carry out the procedure as they would have in-
sufficient time and resources. Therefore, there is a
chance that the maintenance teams would need to
return to perform the appropriate maintenance ac-
tion. Although subtle, there is evidence of this in
Figure 5 on the downward slopes of the sawtooths.
Where the downward slopes of the sawtooths are
smooth, as in Figure 5(a), this indicates the natu-
ral progression of deterioration, without any addi-
tional interference. However, where there are blips
midway down the slope, this indicates an increased
probability of the maintenance teams having to re-
turn to perform a maintenance action, as in Fig-
ure 5(b). As the occurrence of this is only infre-
quent, the increase in probability is small, hence
the subtlety in the output. The enhanced scenario
has more evidence of these blips due to inappro-
priate maintenance actions. Although subtle in the
figures, the financial and operational implications
are significant.
Figure 6 shows the financial costs over time. It
can be seen that the cumulative cost difference
between Figures 6(a) and 6(b) is almost double
across the 100-year timespan being simulated. This
is because in Figure 6(b) there is a much greater
chance of: 1) incorrect maintenance actions being
scheduled which would result in additional costs of
materials and financial compensation due to struc-
tural possession and 2) the effect of imperfect re-
pairs meaning that the condition of the structure
does not reset to an A1 condition after every in-
tervention, which inevitably reduces the time re-
quired before the next intervention is required.
8 CONCLUSION
Modelling a complex system, such as bridge asset
management, is most effective when the balance
between capturing the major processes, but not
making the model overly complex, is struck. Some
of the assumptions made in existing bridge man-
agement models oversimplify the process which es-
tranges it from the real system to the point where
it cannot be considered analogous to the original
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(a) Control scenario, without variability.
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Figure 4: Probability of the element residing in each condition state, aggregated over the entire simulation period.
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Figure 5: Probability of the element condition over time, aggregated by year.
system. This reduces its usefulness as a decision
support tool for bridge portfolio managers.
The purpose of this study was to investigate the
sources of variability within bridge asset manage-
ment, focusing on human-induced variability, the
results of which can help advise where bridge port-
folio managers should focus their efforts going for-
ward. The following sources of variability were in-
vestigated: 1) variability in defect diagnoses caus-
ing the wrong type of maintenance to be sched-
uled and 2) variability in the intervention process
as not all repairs are of equal quality and therefore
the associated condition uplift is different. Expert
judgement and historical data was used to calcu-
late the variability in the processes.
Using an existing WLCC model, two scenar-
ios were simulated and their outputs compared.
The results show that, when comparing the two
scenarios, the enhanced scenario, which consid-
ers human-induced variability, predicts greater fi-
nancial and operational burden than the control
scenario, which does not consider human-induced
variability. The enhanced scenario is much more
accurate to the real-world system and considers
many more of the complexities.
Overall, it is understood that bridge portfo-
lio management is a complex task. The human-
induced variability has a significant impact on
the management of the bridges as it results in
inefficient and ineffective inspection/maintenance
teams, which reduces budgetary efficiency too.
The results of this study show that even moder-
ate amounts of human-induced variability quickly
build up in the system to make the whole process
much more complex and much more capital inten-
sive to manage.
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Figure 6: Cost output of intervention and inspections per year.
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